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about as favorable a set of initial conditions as
one can imagine for getting through ﬁnancial
turmoil with minimal effect on the real side of
the economy.
The issue I wish to explore is this: Is zero
inﬂation, abstracting from measurement error in
the broad price indexes, too low? I think zero is
a very nice number, especially when it comes to
inﬂation. But there is a serious argument that the
economy is likely to work better with a moderate
inﬂation of, say, 2 or 3 percent per year. I disagree
with that argument.
I will concentrate on two arguments for mod-
erate inﬂation. The ﬁrst argument holds that inﬂa-
tion facilitates the smooth operation of labor
markets and thereby promotes maximum employ-
ment in the face of nominal wage rigidity. The
second argument contends that inﬂation, via the
Fisher relationship, keeps nominal interest rates
from falling too close to the zero bound, and
thereby gives the Fed sufﬁcient room to ease—
that is, to cut rates—should a recession appear
imminent.
In my view, both arguments are wrong. I will
begin by outlining some reasons why I believe
that zero inﬂation should be the paramount objec-
tive of monetary policy.
THE CASE FOR ZERO INFLATION
As Chairman Alan Greenspan has pointed out
on numerous occasions, our economy’s ﬁne per-
W
hat is today’s big monetary policy
issue? It is, surely, the extraordi-
nary volatility of the ﬁnancial
markets and the wide quality
spreads that opened up between riskier bonds
and Treasury bonds following the Russian default
in mid-August 1998. No one forecast these prob-
lems; the ﬁnancial-market upset certainly was
not a real, live policy issue back in the spring
and early summer.
We should not underestimate the magnitude
of the current disturbance in the U.S. ﬁnancial
system. Monetary policy today is, I believe, appro-
priately focused on dealing with the possible
effects of the ﬁnancial-market disturbance on the
U.S. economy. The size of that disturbance and
the circumstances surrounding it are so unusual
in the context of U.S. history that policymakers
must concentrate on dealing with this situation
for the time being.
The ﬁnancial upset, however, will disappear
from the radar screen of pressing policy issues as
the markets settle down in due time. All of us
will then return—or should return—to analyzing
longer-run issues. With regard to the current out-
look, I will say only that I am optimistic that we
will work through current problems, painful as
they have been for many, with no signiﬁcant dam-
age to the U.S. economy. My optimism stems from
the economy’s strong initial conditions of low
inﬂation, low and stable inﬂation expectations,
and a well-capitalized banking system. These are
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initially by declining inﬂation and, more recently,
by low and stable inﬂation. Clearly, the U.S. expe-
rience of the last ﬁve years casts doubt on the old
claim that falling inﬂation will inevitably bring
slower real growth or a higher rate of unemploy-
ment. This experience also suggests that reducing
the variability of inﬂation need not increase the
variability of output, as some people argue.
Although the performance of other countries
with low inﬂation is somewhat mixed, my point
is simply that there is little evidence to suggest
that zero inﬂation necessarily implies slow real
growth. Indeed, Robert Barro (1996) and others
have reported systematic evidence to the contrary.
Certainly, there are good reasons to expect that a
zero-inﬂation monetary regime, sustained over
the long run, would enhance an economy’s
performance.
If the monetary authority is committed credi-
bly to zero inﬂation, then one source of interfer-
ence with the efﬁcient working of markets—
uncertainty about expected inﬂation—would be
reduced. Inﬂation uncertainty makes it difﬁcult
for individuals and ﬁrms to distinguish changes
in relative prices among goods and services from
movement in the aggregate price level. Mistakes
in the allocation of resources are more likely to
occur because of this uncertainty, with real growth
consequently less than it could be.
By confusing the meaning of individual price
changes, inﬂation uncertainty also raises uncer-
tainty about the prospects of investment returns.
A rising rate of inﬂation can lead both borrowers
and lenders to be overly optimistic about likely
returns, resulting in inefﬁcient resource commit-
ment. If the price expectations that are assumed
when funds are committed are not realized, bor-
rowers may encounter difﬁculty repaying their
debts, which in turn puts stress on lenders. Thus,
it is reasonable to expect that eliminating uncer-
tainty about the rate of inﬂation will enhance,
although obviously not guarantee, ﬁnancial
stability.
Presumably, to eliminate uncertainty, the rate
of inﬂation need not be zero, but simply predict-
able. For at least two reasons, however, I believe
zero should be the target. First, maintaining a
steady but positive inﬂation rate probably would
be harder politically than maintaining a steady
zero inﬂation. The reason is that we live in a world
where both politicians and economists often argue
that just a little more inﬂation would generate
positive real economic gains. If we accept the
argument that 2 percent inﬂation is okay, why
not 2.5 percent? Let me emphasize that when I
advocate zero inﬂation, I am ignoring measure-
ment questions, such as whether or not bias exists
in the relevant price index. As a practical matter,
policy is probably best speciﬁed in terms of a
measured inﬂation range that accounts for our
best estimate of measurement errors.
A second reason I advocate zero inﬂation
concerns the distortions caused by the interaction
of inﬂation with the tax code. Inﬂation indexing
is incomplete, especially for investment income,
because nominal interest income and nominal
capital gains are subject to tax. Martin Feldstein
(1997) has estimated that reducing inﬂation from
its current level of about 2 percent to zero would
yield substantial, permanent real income gains.
Theoretical analysis by James Bullard and Steven
Russell (1998), and others, also suggests that tax
distortions cost the economy substantial real
performance at higher rates of inﬂation.
In short, I think the case is strong that mone-
tary policy should aim for zero inﬂation as its para-
mount objective. Moreover, I reject the approach
that zero inﬂation must be shown to be superior
to a poorly speciﬁed alternative of some positive
inﬂation. The burden of proof really should fall
on those who contend that positive inﬂation is
better. So, let me now consider the arguments
advanced for a positive rate of inﬂation.
LABOR MARKET ARGUMENTS
One perennial argument in favor of positive
inﬂation is that certain wages must fall relative to
other prices or other wages, and inﬂation allows
this adjustment of real wages to occur in the face
of nominal wage rigidity. The centerpiece of this
argument is the claim that downward nominal
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consistent with flexible real wages in a world
where microeconomic shocks continuously alter
the relative positions of particular ﬁrms, indus-
tries, or occupations. With zero inﬂation, the argu-
ment goes, rigid nominal wages prevent optimal
adjustment to relative price disturbances with
the result that employment varies inefﬁciently.
Therefore, a little inﬂation is a good thing because
it allows wages to fall relative to other prices;
inﬂation “greases the wheels” of labor-market
adjustment.
Zero Inﬂation in a Different Regime
There are, in my opinion, serious ﬂaws at
three levels of this argument. First, the argument
claims that nominal rigidity creates a large inefﬁ-
ciency that inﬂation ameliorates. But, if the claim
of a large inefﬁciency is true (and I will question
it later), a simple theoretical argument creates
the presumption that nominal wages would not
continue to be sticky in a zero-inﬂation regime.
There is some dispute about the extent to
which nominal wages are downwardly rigid. But,
no doubt some employers have found it difﬁcult
to reduce nominal wages during the periods cov-
ered by the most popular data sources. One data
source, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
started during the late 1960s. I mention the sample
period because making an empirical regularity
the foundation, rather than an implication, of
economic theory always is dangerous. Robert
Lucas (1976) elegantly demonstrated this point
more than 20 years ago. To the extent that down-
ward nominal wage rigidity exists, it presumably
serves some economic function. After all, putting
minimum wage laws aside, ﬁxed nominal wages
are not required by law. We cannot assume that
the present degree of wage rigidity—whatever it
is—would continue into a different inﬂation
regime. Indeed, a compelling case can be made
that the extent of wage rigidity we observe would
not survive in a zero-inﬂation regime.
Consider an environment where, broadly
speaking, the annual changes in broad price
indexes usually are close to zero and have been
for some time. Suppose, also, that the Fed’s com-
mitment to maintaining this regime is clear. In
such an environment, nominal wage rigidity,
according to the grease-the-wheels argument,
would generate a large inefﬁciency that inﬂation—
now zero—would no longer ameliorate. This
inefﬁciency, however, is exactly what should
make us doubt that nominal wage rigidity would
continue to exist. The main function of the price
system is to allocate resources by setting relative
prices. Competitive forces likely would eliminate
anything that interferes with relative price adjust-
ment, particularly if failure to adjust is very costly,
unless there is some compelling reason for it to
exist. Could we imagine that nominal wage rigid-
ity would continue during a sustained 10 percent
deﬂation? Of course not. Why? The private costs
of interfering with relative price adjustment would
be too high. It may take longer for competitive
forces to erode nominal rigidity under zero inﬂa-
tion, but the principle is the same.
Keep in mind that the magnitude of ongoing
resource reallocation in U.S. labor markets dwarfs
the employment growth that makes headlines on
the ﬁrst Friday of every month. Jobs appear, jobs
disappear, and people move into and out of them
at rates far higher than net employment growth.
This is prima facie evidence that U.S. labor mar-
kets do not suffer from any massive inefﬁciency.
If nominal wage rigidity creates signiﬁcant
economic inefﬁciency, it seems entirely plausible
that it is perpetuated by inﬂation. I admit I do not
know for sure. Based on the current state of eco-
nomic theory, however, I think we must favor the
presumption that inefﬁcient wage rigidity would
disappear in a zero-inﬂation economy. This posi-
tion makes sense if we take economic theory
seriously.
Other Mechanisms for Relative Wage
Adjustment
A second ﬂaw in the grease-the-wheels argu-
ment is that it imagines only two mechanisms for
achieving adjustments to a worker’s relative wage:
Either cut the nominal wage, or let all other prices
around it rise. In fact, the workings of labor mar-
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so the presence of nominal wage rigidity— were
it to exist—might not be a hindrance in a zero-
inﬂation world.
First, average compensation tends to rise over
time, as overall productivity improves. Thus, in
a zero-inﬂation environment, nominal wages may
not need to fall, even in some declining occupa-
tions. Proponents of the grease-the-wheels view
sometimes ignore this mechanism.
Internal labor markets provide yet another
adjustment mechanism. Compensation tends to
increase with seniority, partly because of an
individual’s accumulation of human capital.
Edward Lazear (1981) has argued that an upward-
sloping path for earnings also acts as a mechanism
to overcome agency problems within the ﬁrm.
James Malcomson (1984) and others have argued
that promotions may play a similar role; rather
than simply ﬁlling positions necessary for the
technological operation of the ﬁrm, promotions
provide necessary incentives for those at lower
levels of the hierarchy.
The common theme in these observations
about internal labor markets is that an individual
worker typically will expect an increasing real
wage. Therefore, the kind of base adjustment
achieved by inﬂation can also be accomplished
by delaying wage change relative to an individual’s
upward-sloping real wage path.
Of course, there is a segment of the labor
market where little human capital accumulation
exists and long-term implicit contracts are rare.
But, for obvious reasons, this is exactly the seg-
ment where turnover costs are low on both the
supply and demand sides of the market. Hence,
any nominal wage rigidity that is present is not
especially costly.
INFLATION AND RELATIVE PRICE
VARIABILITY ARE LINKED
The third ﬂaw in the labor-market case for
positive inﬂation is perhaps the most transparent.
Inﬂation tends to increase the sort of microeco-
nomic shocks—because cross-sectional variation
in price changes tends to rise with higher aggregate
inﬂation—that underlay the case for pursuing a
positive rate of inﬂation. Thus, the claim that inﬂa-
tion helps the economy cope efﬁciently with rela-
tive price changes is suspect immediately, since
there is more relative price variation to cope with
if there is more inﬂation.
Labor Market Costs as Well as Beneﬁts
Overall, I believe that the beneﬁts of inﬂation
as labor-market grease are exaggerated. Further-
more, inﬂation itself seems to worsen the problem
it ostensibly alleviates. In addition to these theo-
retical arguments, we now have some direct
evidence, supplied by Erica Groshen and Mark
Schweitzer (1996, 1999). They recognize that
compensation typically is set for at least a year,
and that there are, in essence, two pieces to a
ﬁrm’s wage-setting process. First, management
decides on the overall change in the wage pool,
based in part on the rate of inﬂation expected to
prevail during the following year. This wage pool,
in effect, sets the ﬁrm-wide budget constraint.
Second, individual wages and salaries are adjusted
in a way that satisﬁes the budget constraint. This
two-step process is explicit in many organizations.
Mistakes occur during the ﬁrst stage when
managers misforecast inﬂation. “Sand-in-the-
wheels” effects occur if higher average levels of
inﬂation result in more inﬂation variability, caus-
ing larger inﬂation forecasting errors. A conse-
quence is that inﬂation will cause more interﬁrm
variation in wage adjustment. Grease effects oper-
ate, as I outlined earlier, and imply more disper-
sion of interoccupational wage adjustment. The
grease effects should taper off as inﬂation rises
because some level of inﬂation enables employers
to make all of the relative wage adjustments they
would make in a frictionless labor market. Because
they view wage setting as a two-stage process,
Groshen and Schweitzer estimate the grease and
sand effects separately. They ﬁnd evidence of
both effects, with sand effects rising rapidly with
the inﬂation rate. Comparing the grease and sand
effects directly, Groshen and Schweitzer ﬁnd that
even for low inﬂation rates the net beneﬁt of inﬂa-
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although point estimates of the gross beneﬁt do
slightly exceed estimates of gross cost.
One might quibble with the speciﬁcs of their
empirical strategy, but Groshen and Schweitzer’s
emphasis on evaluating costs as well as beneﬁts
is absolutely correct. From the standpoint of labor
markets, I think it is fair to say that the evidence
of net beneﬁts from an inﬂationary monetary
policy is slim to none.
THE ZERO NOMINAL INTEREST
RATE BOUNDARY
Now let us consider whether concerns about
conducting countercyclical monetary policy in a
low-inﬂation environment can justify a positive
rate of inﬂation. Specifically, does price level
stability cause special problems for monetary
policy because nominal interest rates cannot be
less than zero?
The zero-bound view is an old and much
debated one in macroeconomics. With rising inﬂa-
tion during the 1970s and early 1980s, the issue
largely became moot, as policymakers scrambled
to get inﬂation back under control and to regain
lost credibility. Recently, however, the topic has
resurfaced as inﬂation rates in the industrialized
countries have fallen and stayed low during the
1990s, and as central banks around the world
have adopted inﬂation targeting as a method of
achieving and committing to price stability.
The zero-bound view holds that moderate
inﬂation aids in the implementation of stabiliza-
tion policy by keeping nominal interest rates from
falling too low. The bottom line, according to this
argument, is that an inﬂation target of zero inter-
feres with the attempts of monetary policymakers
to stimulate an economy in recession because the
nominal interest rate obviously cannot fall below
zero. Put another way, with moderate ongoing
inﬂation the policymakers have room to push
the real rate of interest below zero, which they
cannot do when the steady inﬂation rate is zero.
The zero-bound story begins with the com-
monplace idea that monetary policy is concerned
with setting a short-term nominal interest rate—
in the United States, the nominal federal funds
rate. A higher nominal federal funds rate is often
described as a tighter policy, while a lower nom-
inal federal funds rate is described as an easier
policy. When the economy is weak, the monetary
authorities lower the nominal federal funds target
in an effort to stimulate interest-rate-sensitive
sectors of the economy. So according to this view,
when a recession hits, the current level of the
federal funds rate determines the number of
basis points the Fed has available to combat the
recession: the lower the initial funds rate, the
less scope for subsequent easing. As you might
guess, I dislike this characterization of monetary
policy, but let me ﬁnish the story.
Of course, ﬁnancial market participants are
interested mainly in the real interest rate, not the
nominal interest rate. A simple Fisherian decom-
position divides any nominal interest rate (with
zero default risk) into two major components—a
real component determined by equilibrium con-
ditions in the economy and a nominal component
determined by the expected inﬂation rate.
The zero-bound view holds that the expected
inﬂation component of nominal interest rates
moves little over periods as long as a year, so that
adjustments in the nominal federal funds rate
mainly change real returns at the very short end
of the term structure. Movements in short-term
rates then lead to adjustments in longer-term real
interest rates.
What hampers stabilization policy in a low-
inﬂation environment, according to the zero-
bound view? If inﬂation is zero and expected to
remain that way, then the expected inﬂation com-
ponent of nominal interest rates is zero, and the
nominal rate is lower on average than it would
be in a world of persistent inﬂation. Thus, in a
recession, the Fed would have less room to cut
interest rates because of the zero nominal bound.
The end result, according to this view, is a longer
and deeper recession than would otherwise be
the case. The message is clear: If the Fed is to
help the economy in times of distress, nominal
interest rates must be kept high enough in normal
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of inﬂation.
The zero-bound view has raised many counter-
arguments over the years. Perhaps most obviously,
this view places heavy emphasis on the idea that
monetary policy can be used to ﬁne tune the
macroeconomy, downplaying well-known con-
cerns that attempts to ﬁne tune can contribute to
economic instability. Leaving that issue aside,
however, there are still several reasons to doubt
the validity of the zero-bound argument for pur-
suing a policy of positive inﬂation.
Monetary Policy Is Fundamentally Not
About Nominal Interest Rates
First, we must remember that nominal interest
rates do not indicate the true stance of monetary
policy even though, as a practical matter, the Fed
implements short-term policy by targeting the
nominal federal funds rate. This method of imple-
mentation has been effective in recent years.
Controlling the funds rate is not, however, an
end in itself. Fundamentally, monetary policy is
reﬂected in the growth of the money stock and,
ultimately, the rate of inﬂation. So the idea that
central bankers are somehow trapped if the nomi-
nal short-term interest rate nears zero seems quite
a stretch to me. We are in the business of providing
liquidity to the macroeconomy, and if the situa-
tion calls for it, liquidity can always be injected,
regardless of the level of nominal interest rates.
The ﬁrst years of the Great Depression offer
perhaps the clearest illustration that monetary
policy is fundamentally about providing liquidity
and not about controlling nominal interest rates.
During that time, nominal interest rates were
low, which seemed to indicate an “easy” mone-
tary policy. But as Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz (1963) have noted, from 1930 to 1933
the money stock was falling rapidly, indicating a
far tighter policy than was intended. Of course,
that policy was an unmitigated disaster, as both
output and prices fell by a third and the unem-
ployment rate hit 25 percent. That experience, as
well as other, less dramatic historical episodes,
should make it obvious that blind adherence to
nominal interest rates as indicators of the stance
of monetary policy can be tragically misleading.
We might also do well to remember that dur-
ing the late 1950s and early 1960s, the nominal
annualized yield on three-month Treasury bills
ﬂuctuated around 3 percent, while the yield on
10-year Treasury bonds was around 4 percent.
These yields are below, but in the general ballpark,
of those we observe today. Consumer price index
inﬂation during that period averaged about 2
percent on a year-overyear basis—not too different
from today’s inﬂation rate. So, while we have
not seen a sustained zero-inﬂation environment
in the United States during the postwar era, we
have seen an environment not too different from
today’s in terms of relatively low inﬂation. And
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was
no obvious impediment to the operation of mone-
tary policy just because inﬂation was low.
Inﬂation and Output Variability
The relative stability of our economy in
recent years suggests that low inﬂation probably
contributes both to less inﬂation variability and
to less output variability. Throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s, by contrast, when inﬂation rose
sharply and then fell abruptly, the United States
suffered through three recessions, including two
of the most severe recessions of the postwar era.
To be sure, during that period, the U.S. economy
was hit with shocks from external sources, but at
the same time monetary policy was decidedly
uneven— resulting in a substantial inﬂation that
caused both unnecessary distortions and proved
difﬁcult to tame. Thus, the postwar experience
strongly suggests that lower inﬂation is associated
with less volatile inﬂation, and lower inﬂation
volatility is reﬂected in lower volatility in real
output. Even in a zero-inﬂation environment the
lower bound on nominal interest rates probably
would not be a problem for stabilization policy
because economic volatility itself would likely
be lower.
Nonlinear Effects Near Zero
A ﬁnal reason to doubt that monetary policy
would run aground in a zero-inﬂation world stems
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This nonlinearity implies that a given interest
rate change, measured in basis points, may well
have a larger impact when interest rates are low
than when they are high.
Much of the thinking behind the zero-bound
view is centered on the extrapolation of linear
effects to very low interest rate environments. In
much of the work on this issue, the average effects
of short-run monetary policy changes are esti-
mated using postwar data, which include many
years of high inﬂation. There is little reason to
think that coefﬁcients estimated from an envi-
ronment of relatively high inﬂation would be
good proxies for the coefﬁcients in the new
circumstance.
We might expect that a given basis points
change in the nominal federal funds rate target
would have a larger impact when interest rates
are lower. Certainly, there is no reason to expect
that the response of investment to changes in the
nominal interest rate is linear. At any point in time
countless investment projects are available, and
as the nominal cost of funds moves lower, the
net present value of many more of these projects
becomes positive. Accordingly, investment would
be unbounded at very low real interest rates,
implying that the Fed could conduct a counter-
cyclical policy just as actively and effectively
when interest rates were low, even if the nominal
federal funds rate target was near zero.
ZERO INFLATION IS NOT TOO
LOW
To summarize, it seems to me that neither
the arguments about wage stickiness nor those
concerning the zero bound for nominal interest
rates make a convincing case that monetary policy
should aim for a positive rate of inﬂation. Instead,
I believe the logic and the evidence both suggest
that the appropriate goal for monetary policy
should be price stability, that is, a long-run inﬂa-
tion rate of approximately zero.
Today we are enjoying the beneﬁts of a low
and comparatively stable rate of inﬂation. In our
present state, we should not forget the high costs
of inﬂation. Inﬂation makes planning difﬁcult
for individuals and ﬁrms, it interferes with the
operation of markets, and it interacts insidiously
with the tax code to discourage saving and invest-
ment. Moreover, inﬂation’s effects are felt most
acutely by members of society who are economi-
cally the most vulnerable. In arguing for a positive
rate of inﬂation, therefore, the burden of proof
should rest with those who contend that our
economy would perform better with inﬂation
than without it. Inﬂation proponents also should
explain how a moderate rate of inﬂation could
be maintained without inching ever higher. In
my view, the case for positive inﬂation has not
been proven.
A central bank’s single most important job is
preserving the value of the nation’s money. Mone-
tary policy has succeeded if the public can reason-
ably trust that a dollar will buy tomorrow what it
will buy today. At this point, inﬂation will have
ceased to be a hindrance to the smooth functioning
of our market economy. I cannot promise that
price stability will mean an end to the business
cycle, to unemployment, or to occasional ﬁnancial
distress. Indeed, I am willing to bet that a few
years from now we will look back on 1998 and
conclude that the stability of the inﬂation environ-
ment was important to containing the ﬁnancial-
market upset that started in August.
We should not be seduced by arguments that
a little inﬂation is a good thing. Look at the record:
Over the past 50 years, our economy has per-
formed better when inﬂation was low than when
it was high. There simply is no compelling evi-
dence that we could foster sustained economic
growth by pursuing an inﬂationary monetary
policy. The evidence points in the other direction.
Thus, I am conﬁdent that our economy’s long-run
performance would be enhanced by a monetary
policy that aims at, achieves, and maintains a
zero rate of inﬂation.
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